and improved conditions in Europe contributed to some return migration on the part of descendants of previous European immigrants. 1 A similar pattern has also emerged for Asian descendants. The fourth wave continued through the 1990s and up to the present, and throughout Latin American emigrants have increasingly favored the US as their prime destination. By 2000, more than 55 percent of all immigrants in the US were Latin Americans, and about half of these were Mexicans. 2 This fact has led both governments to discuss seriously how to manage more orderly migrations across their common border.
As we stated above, emigration out of the region has always characterized most of the crossborder migration in Latin America. Cross-border migration within Latin America has always been relatively modest, as Tables 1 and 2 confirm for the 1990s. To begin with, except for local migrantmagnets like Argentina and Venezuela, low-wage Latin America has far smaller foreign-born population shares than does the high-wage labor market up north: the foreign-born share for Canada and the US combined is 8.9 percent; that for all of Latin America is only 1.4 percent; and that for Latin America less Argentina and Venezuela is a tiny 0.6 percent. Tables 1 and 2 can be used in another way to document the dominance of inter-Latin American cross-border migration relative to intra-Latin American cross-border migration. Latin Americans living outside their country of birth, but in the Americas, are distributed as 79.1 percent in Canada and the US versus 20.9 percent in their home region.
In short, Latin American cross-border migration is dominated by movements to high-wage labor markets in Canada and the US, not by movements to low-wage labor markets in the region itself. Unless
Latin America starts some significant economic 'catch up' on the US over the next few decades, crossborder migration within Latin America in unlikely to rise in relative importance. Thus, the rest of this paper will focus on emigration from Latin America, and on US immigration in particular.
1 In Europe, the definition of immigrant depends on the nationality of the parents (for instance, a person born from two French parents will be granted French citizenship, no matter where he or she was born), while in countries like the US and Canada, it depends on the country where the person was born. 2 The IRCA legalization Act of 1986, which intended to regulated illegal immigration, contributed to this large increase of Mexicans in the US. Table 3 presents the age structure of immigrants entering the US between 1997 and 2001. There we focus on Latin American (LA) immigrants and compare their age structure with that of the populations in their countries of origin. The immigrants have been divided into three age groups: 0-14, 15-64 (a range representing the active adult population, which in turn could be used as a proxy for those in the labor force), and 65 years and older. Table 3 suggests no significant difference between LA immigrants and the rest of the world, showing that 76-77% of US immigrants fall into the 15-64 range.
Who Emigrates from Latin America?
Now compare the share of the LA immigrants adult with that of their sending country, 61%, implying that LA immigrants entering the US were much more likely to be labor-market-oriented adults than was true of their home populations, for a difference of more than 15 percentage points. This self-selection of laborforce-oriented adults has been true of international migrations since the early 19 th century (Hatton and Williamson 1998: pp. 11-12) , and, although Table 3 does not document it, migrations have always selfselected young adults (Williamson 2001) . What is true of sending Latin America is also true of receiving US: the US population aged 15-64 accounted for 66% of the total population. In short, Latin American immigrants were much more likely to be adults active in the labor force than the populations they left or joined. Thus, their migration clearly served to reduce labor supply in their home country and increase it in the US. Finally, the fact that these immigrants tended to be adults (and probably young adults) suggests that they were responding primarily to labor market forces, rather than to political instability or violence at home. Immigrants fleeing political conditions at home tend to move as a family, while immigrants responding to labor market signals are those of economically-active ages. While Latin American immigrants to the US are more educated and more likely to be economically active than their compatriots left at home, they are less educated, on average, than the Americans they join. To the extent that education helps predict income, the inference here is that Latin American emigration creates earnings inequality at home and earnings inequality in the United States.
This evidence on educational attainments and age raises a relevant question: Does emigration from Latin America reduce or increase poverty rates and inequality there? Immigrants into the United
States entered at the bottom of the urban income distribution before World War I (Hatton and Williamson 1998: Chps. 7-11) and the same seems to be true of Latin American immigrants today. But did they and do they leave from the bottom of the income distribution in the sending regions? Based on this educational attainment and age data, it looks like the answer is no. 6 Indeed, we would have been surprised by any other answer since history tells us that world migration has always been financially constrained.
Whether legal or illegal, international migration is expensive, and really poor people can't afford it.
Consider the case of Mexico, a country that supplied almost a third of US immigration in the 1990s.
Daniel Chiquiar and Gordon Hanson (2002) have recently shown the following: starting with the facts we have seen in Table 4 --Mexican immigrants are much less educated than the average United States citizen, but they are more educated than the average Mexican --Mexican immigrants living in the US would have fallen mostly in the middle and upper portions of the Mexican wage distribution, not at the bottom; and, thus, Mexican immigration has raised income inequality at home (Chiquiar and Hanson 2002: pp. 3-4) . It does not seem to have reduced poverty rates in Mexico. We need to establish whether these Mexican findings apply to the rest of Latin America.
We are aware that having lots of relatively skilled LA immigrants in the US seems to signal a brain drain problem if these immigrants represent an important share of the skilled labor force in their home country, if they remit at low rates, and if they never return. But if they remit at high rates, and/or return and/or create business links with their home countries, a current brain drain might well turn in to a future brain gain.
Explaining US Immigration by Source Country
Suppose we start with Latin America is largely a matter of explaining emigration to the United States. Table 6 reports flows of 4 We must note however that these numbers do not take into account that more than 50% of illegal immigrants in the US come from Latin America (in particular from Mexico) and that this fact could influence some of these patterns. variable is the number of (legal) immigrants accepted into the United States who were born in some sending country as a proportion of that country's population. Since this rate is bounded at zero, we use the log of the rate in our regressions. This paper uses random effects regressions, a method which exploits both the cross-section and time-series variation in the data. The results appear in Table 8 .
8
The first regression equation is estimated including all 81 source countries while the second regression is estimated only for the 22 Latin American countries in the sample. We focus first on the estimates for the complete, world 81-country sample. The explanatory variables are those suggested by 5 These educational self-selection patterns are less dramatic for tertiary educational achievement. 6 Borjas (1987) and the Roy model not withstanding. 7 Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002) . That previous paper also describes in detail the sources of our data and the variables included in the data base. 8 For the Latin American sample (n=22) in theories of migration, explained at greater length elsewhere (Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2002; .
Relative income between the sending country and the US is, of course, central to the migration decision and it is represented in Table 8 by the ratio of the source country purchasing-power-parityadjusted GDP per capita to that of the US. The coefficient is negative as expected and highly significant.
Furthermore, the coefficient implies that a ten percent rise in US income (the leader surging ahead), or a ten percent fall in source country income (the follower falling behind), leads to a 15 percent rise in immigration from that country. However, the migration decision also depends on the relative return to skills, not just income differentials, and hence the income effect must be 'deflated' by relative skill levels.
Here we use the ratio of the number of years of education of those aged 15 and over in the source country relative to the US, and, as expected, this variable has a negative impact on immigration. Holding income constant, a rise in the source country's average education level by 10 percent (equivalent to 0.55 years of schooling averaged across all sending countries) reduces the immigration rate by 7 percent. We are not asserting that more education diminishes emigration rates, but rather only that GDP per capita differentials are explained in part by schooling differentials, and that this factor must be accommodated in the analysis. If income differentials were instead documented by earnings differentials for individuals at common levels of schooling, then we might well get different results on the schooling variable.
Migration theory also suggests that differences across countries in the return to skills will select migrants from different parts of the skill distribution (Borjas, 1987 (Borjas, , 1991 , what has come to be called the Roy model (Roy 1951 ). These Roy model effects are captured here by the ratio of the Gini coefficients, a statistic describing the distribution of household income, source country relative to the US. If a sending country has more inequality than the US (an unlikely case for most sending regions except Latin America), then those at the top of the income distribution will have less incentive to emigrate, while those at the bottom will have more. If instead a sending country has less inequality than the US, then those at the bottom will have less incentive to immigrate, while those at the top will have more. If inequality is similar in the source and destination, then, provided that the source has a higher average income, there is an incentive to emigrate throughout the income distribution. Thus, unless poverty constrains poor potential immigrants from leaving the sending country, the immigration rate to the US should follow an inverted U shaped function of relative inequality.
The results in Table 8 strongly support the Roy hypothesis, with the peak immigration rate occurring at a ratio of 1.12, very close to the point where inequality in the destination and source country are the same. We shall return to this finding below, since, in the Latin American case, it may need to be reinterpreted in terms of the qualification in italics, namely, poverty is likely to constrain the emigration of the very poor residing at the bottom of the income distribution in the sending country.
Unless return migration is very inexpensive, 9 the discounted present value attached to any long distance move should be higher at younger ages since the returns are spread over a longer future working life. Thus, source countries with larger cohorts of young people should generate more migrants and higher emigration rates. In Table 8 , the coefficient on the share of population aged 15-29 is positive as expected but it is not significant, at least for the full 81 country sample. We have no explanation for this surprising result, especially, as we shall see in a moment, given the opposite is true for Latin America alone. Most
observers also stress what has come to be called the 'friends and relatives effect.' An established stock of previous migrants from the same source generates network effects that lower the costs and reduce the risks of migration, and, through remittances by previous migrants, may even supply the initial investment necessary to finance the move by new migrants. Table 8 documents this 'friends and relatives effect' by using the stock of those residing in the US but born in the source country, per thousand of the source population, lagged one period. 10 Since this effect is sometimes thought to be nonlinear, the squared term is also included. The pattern of coefficients reported in Table 8 implies that the stock effect is most powerful at low levels and that it diminishes as the stock increases. At the average stock/population ratio in our data, the effect of raising the expatriate stock by 1000 is to generate an additional annual inflow 9 Under these conditions, migrations are less likely to be permanent and are more likely to repeat. 10 The lag is introduced under the premise that the 'friends and relatives' effect has to be in place before the migrant makes the move.
from the source country of about 10 immigrants per year. A very powerful influence indeed, implying very strong historical persistence.
Other country characteristics also matter and a very important one is distance from the destination. This gravity effect is measured in Table 8 by the great circle distance from Chicago in thousands of miles. The coefficient indicates that an additional thousand miles between sending country and the US reduces the immigration rate by 21 percent. 11 Whether the country is landlocked also has a large negative effect, although it is not quite significant at conventional levels. Even more important is whether the source country is English speaking, a factor which increases the number of immigrants from the sending country almost three fold. Political upheavals and violence, the most important source of which are civil wars, also have a significant effect, increasing the number of immigrants to the US by about 22 percent.
Clearly, US immigration policy also matters in determining immigrant source and Table 8 accommodates this by a series of dummies. Prior to 1978 there were separate quotas for the Western Finally regional dummies are also included. Here the excluded region is Western Europe so that the coefficients on the other regions reflect differences from that benchmark. For the most part, the coefficients on these regional dummies are small, suggesting that the 'fundamentals' can by themselves explain regional differences in US immigration rates. Notable exceptions are the very large negative intercept for Africa and the fairly large positive intercept for the Middle East. Within the Americas, there are large coefficients for the border states --Canada and Mexico, and for the Caribbean. While these reflect the effects of contiguity they also reflect the place in the US (Chicago) from which distance is measured. 
Explaining US Immigration from Latin America
As Figures 2-4 document, cross-border migration rates vary enormously in Latin America. What accounts for that variance? Are the same fundamentals at work that we have isolated for the world at large?
The second column in Table 8 reports estimates for the 22 Latin American countries alone. These are remarkably similar to those in the first column for all 81 countries. Hence, it appears that in general Latin American emigration to the United States is driven by the same forces as for US immigration as a whole, although the forces themselves may, of course, be larger or smaller. However, there are some differences in the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients that are worth stressing. The most notable difference between Latin America and the rest is the large and now significant effect of the share of population aged 15-29. This regional difference may be explained by the fact that long distance moves from Asia and Africa may be more typically family affairs, an issue that future research needs to explore.
In any case, this result implies that an increase in the proportion of the population aged 15-29 from, say, 25 to 30 percent would increase the typical Latin American country's US immigration rate by 20 percent.
Furthermore, the coefficients on income and schooling differences are larger for Latin America. Thus a ten percent increase in US relative income increases immigration from the typical Latin American country by 25 percent and a ten percent increase in US relative education reduces it by 11 percent, much bigger effects than we saw for all sending regions combined.
The other coefficients are very similar to those estimated on the full set of countries with the exception of the dummy for 1992-8 which is negative. This may reflect the effect of the increased favorable weight given to skills in the 1990 Immigration Act or it may simply reflect an increasing number of Latin Americans choosing an illegal entry into the US (Table 7) .
Inequality effects are also more powerful for Latin America, but the maximum immigration rate, where the Gini coefficient ratio is 1.26, still fairly close to one. This inverse U shape implies that immigration to the US is lower from those Latin American countries that are very equal or very unequal compared to the US, and higher for those in between (that is, most like the US). Note, however, that this is not quite the same as saying that Latin American immigrants into the US came from middle income groups. Consider the following possibility: Because Latin American income distributions are more unequal than the US, migration should select from the bottom of the sending country's distribution, that is, it should be mostly the very poor who move. However, there is also the 'poverty trap' to consider.
First, the very poor are unlikely to have the resources necessary to invest in the long distance move to the United States. Second, and in addition, roughly constant absolute costs of migration across prospective migrants implies that these costs would be proportionately bigger the poorer the potential migrant. If either or both of these 'trap' effects dominate, then higher poverty rates in the source country should serve to diminish US immigration from that country. Thus, while the migration incentives may be very great for those at the bottom of the distribution, poverty makes it impossible. At the top of the income distribution, there may be no financial constraint on emigration, but there will also be far less incentive to move. Thus, it may be those in the middle of the sending country's distribution that actually emigrate. it must be resolved with more research if we want to know whether more liberal US immigration policy will really serve to diminish poverty in Latin America.
Latin America and the 'Sources' of US Immigration
Latin American immigration into the United States far exceeds that of other regions. This dominance largely reflects higher rates of Latin American immigration to the US as compared with other source areas. As we have seen, there are also significant differences across countries. In order to explore some of these differences, we use our estimated equations in Table 8 to decompose the observed differences in log immigration rates into 'sources' emanating from differences in the fundamentals driving immigration.
We first compare Latin America immigration rates to the US with those from other sending regions using the parameter estimates from the first column of Table 8 for the full 81 countries. The first row of Table 9 shows the average value of the log immigration rate from Latin America minus the average value of the log immigration rate from Europe, Africa and Asia. This difference in average log points is multiplied by 100, and it relates to the average over the 28 years from 1971 to 1998. On average, Latin America has immigration rates to the US that are 171 log points higher than the average for Europe, 183 for Asia and 317 for Africa. Let us start the analysis with the European comparison.
A little less than a third of the log immigration rate difference between Latin America and Europe (50.7 log points) is explained by lower per capita income in Latin America as compared with Europe.
Lower education levels in Latin America partly offset this effect. Inequality contributes very little because, although Latin American inequality is higher and European inequality is lower than the US, the former is closer to the US level and hence nearer to the maximum of the inverted U. Demographic structure accounts for surprisingly little of the difference as does the immigrant stock. Most important among the other fundamentals which favor Latin America are distance, which accounts for 46 log points, and a higher incidence of English speaking. By themselves, these two fundamentals explain more than a third of the difference in European and Latin American immigration rates to the US.
Latin American immigration rates into the US are higher by a massive 317 log points than those of the 14 African countries in our sample. Per capita income and schooling now have the reverse effect since both are considerably lower in Africa than in Latin America. The most important variables accounting for the difference in US immigration rates for these two regions are distance (positive) and English speaking (negative). While most of the difference in average immigration remains unexplained by the nine fundamentals included in the analysis, one excluded fundamental that is likely to have played a powerful role is poverty. In contrast with Latin America, we know that Africans are highly mobile within Africa (Hatton and Williamson, 2003) . Thus, it may be that poverty levels are just too high to permit mass migrations out of Africa over longer distances. The comparison with the 19 sampled Asian countries (some of which are in the Middle East) is also interesting. With the exception of the immigrant stock, all but one of the remaining fundamentals explain very little of the 183 log point difference between Latin
American and Asian immigration rates. Thus, these Asian countries are, on average, very similar to those in Latin America. The higher Latin American immigration rates are largely due to one fundamental --distance. Table 10 searches for causes of the wide variance in US immigration rates across Latin America.
Comparisons Across Latin America
Much like Table 9 , this one looks for the sources of the variance in the log immigration rate. These sources are, once again, calculated using the second regression in Table 8 It is also worth asking how these immigration fundamentals contributed to changes in immigration rates over the last thirty years, although we are prepared for large residuals given that the R 2 in Table 8 for the time series is so much lower than for the cross section. Table 11 offers the decomposition, again based on the regression for the Latin American countries alone. Here we examine contributions to the change in the immigration rate between 1971-1973 and 1996-1998 in log points times 100. 14 For Mexico the effects of changes in schooling years and inequality relative to the US, as well as increases in the young adult cohort and the immigrant stock, far exceed the actual rise in the immigration rate. Thus, although there has been a substantial rise in emigration from Mexico to the US, based on the fundamentals it should have been larger still. In other cases such as El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru, immigration to the US rose by far more than the fundamentals predict. While all three of these countries have experienced political instability, our civil war measure (omitted in the table) cannot by itself explain much of these long-term increases in immigration to the US. Still, rising civil conflict did contribute some to rising US immigration rates for Columbia and Peru, and to falling rates for Guatemala.
While individual country experience differs from that predicted by the fundamentals, it is notable that the majority of entries in Table 11 are positive. Thus, lagging income per capita growth relative to the US was pushing up the immigration rate for 16 of the 22 countries. Furthermore, some of these laggingincome effects were powerful, like for Argentina, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela and Trinidad.
Symmetrically, Chile's good performance kept potential emigrants at home. On the other hand, education levels increased relative to the US in 20 of the countries, led by Panama and Venezuela, and this added a further push to northward migration. The effects of changing relative inequality, are mixed although they are large for some countries such as Brazil, Honduras, Jamaica and Mexico. Where this effect is positive (Brazil, Honduras and Mexico), this is chiefly because increasing inequality in the US has narrowed the gap between the relatively unequal Latin American countries and the increasingly unequal United States.
The demographic effects are also mainly positive, since young adult shares rose in most of Latin America.
These demographic effects were fairly small in most countries, though they mattered a great deal in one very important emigrating country, Mexico (accounting for 65 percent of the rise in the log immigration rate). Finally there is that powerful contribution arising from the growth of the immigrant stock in the US, particularly for the Caribbean and Central America. These migrant stock effects are actually the result of fundamentals in the past which have contributed to present high immigration rates. High Latin American immigration rates have been sustained over the decades in large part due to these migrant stock effects.
14 Note that the table excludes the impact of changing US immigration policy.
An Agenda
We think that there are a number of directions that work on Latin American cross-border migration should go in the future. It seems to us that the first step should be to extend the analysis in this Latin America is so small compared to migration out of the region. This appears to be much less true for
Africa and Asia, and we need to know why. Is it simply due to the closeness of a huge high-wage country, the US? Finally, we need to sharpen our understanding of which forces have mattered most in raising the Latin America emigration rate since the 1960s, especially the role of policy in the receiving regions. Over the past two centuries, all emigrant countries have passed through similar life-cycles. Very poor countries have very low emigration rates: high incentive to leave is constrained by poverty. As countries start developing, these constraints are released and emigration rates soar. At some middle point when they reach a more mature industrial status, emigration rates peak, falling thereafter. Where does Latin America fit in this life-cycle? Will emigration to the US rise or fall over the next few decades? And what will be the most important underlying forces at work? Can those forces be easily influenced by policy? We need some answers, and a better understanding of the last few decades is likely to supply them. 178  46  364  228  177  175  42  89  18  897  Guatemala  113  119  121  147  266  154  39  124  27  531  Haiti  73  5  141  37  64  22  13  15  2  1,593  Honduras  138  189  300  220  182  111  27  111  17  429  Jamaica  26  …  11  19  29  8  2  4  …  213  Nicaragua  142  54  329  168  307  161  24  135  36  2,033  Panama  367  75  981  366  1,680  409  36  280  75  1,216  Trinidad and Tobago  73  3  …  9  21  12  6  6 
